By Tasreeq Ferreira and Yolo Samela
In South African labour law, urgent applications in the Labour Court (LC) serve as a vital mechanism for parties facing immediate and irreparable harm that cannot await the ordinary course of proceedings. However, such applications are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny to prevent abuse, self-created urgency, and unnecessary interference with internal employer processes, particularly incomplete disciplinary inquiries. This cautious approach ensures that the urgent court roll is reserved for genuine emergencies, while upholding the integrity of workplace dispute resolution mechanisms under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA).
The authors of this article have observed, through LC judgments, that legal practitioners often approach the LC on an urgent basis but are later faced with their matters getting struck from the urgent roll for failing to meet the prerequisites of an urgent application. This is evidence of practitioners undermining the architecture of resolving labour disputes through the normal course despite the LC in Zanele Lesley Mthumkhulu v Standard Bank of South Africa (LC) (unreported case no 2025-250203, 6-1-2026) (Tlhotlhalemaje J) (Mthumkhulu) reaffirming that the consequences of self-created urgency are fatal to an application.
The Rule regulating relief for urgent proceedings in the LC will be dissected below as well as case law demonstrating the success and failures of these applications.
Urgent relief is primarily regulated by r 38 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the LC (Rules). According to Rule 38(2) of the Rules, an applicant must file a proper application supported by an affidavit that clearly sets out the reasons for urgency and why urgent relief is necessary, explains any deviation from ordinary rules, and justifies any request for abridged notice periods as contemplated in s 68(2) of the LRA. Further considerations the court must take into account when considering urgent relief are interest of the respondent party, and any prejudice it may suffer if the matter is disposed of on an urgent basis.
The leading authority on these requirements remains Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) (Jiba), in which Van Niekerk J emphasised that there are degrees of urgency. The extent to which the court will relax ordinary procedural rules depends directly on the degree of urgency demonstrated. Critically, applicants are not entitled to rely on self-created urgency; courts will not countenance delays by the applicant that artificially manufacture a crisis. This principle was reinforced in Tshwaedi v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Council [2000] 4 BLLR 469 (LC) (Tshwaedi), which stressed the duty of promptitude once urgency arises. Furthermore, the court in Mthumkhulu stated that: ‘It does not assist applicants to be supine in the face of the alleged harm or prejudice, and only to act at their own leisure. The more time that an applicant takes to approach the court for an urgent relief, the more any urgency dissipates.
’ A further important distinction, drawn from cases such as East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others (GJ) (unreported case no 11/33767, 23-9-2011) (Notshe AJ) (East Rock Trading 7), lies between procedural urgency on the one hand and the question whether the applicant can obtain substantial redress in due course on the other. Even where some delay has occurred, urgency may still be granted if the applicant can show that they will not receive adequate relief at a later hearing. However, merely equating this to a lack of alternative remedy is insufficient; the founding affidavit must properly address the issue of substantial redress. The LC is particularly reluctant to intervene in incomplete disciplinary proceedings except in exceptional circumstances, preferring instead to allow internal processes to run their course in the interests of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy.
The recent judgment in Madonsela v Legal Practice Council and Others [2025] 8 BLLR 837 (LC) (Madonsela), provides a compelling illustration of these principles in practice. Ms Zandile Madonsela (Ms Madonsela), an administrator employed by the Legal Practice Council (LPC) since 2019 in its Gauteng Risk and Assessment Department, faced disciplinary charges linked to an alleged corrupt scheme involving the falsification of attorneys’ audits and the irregular issuance of professional certificates in exchange for money. After being placed on precautionary suspension and receiving notice of the disciplinary hearing in January 2025, various delays ensued through preliminary points, settlement discussions, and the exchange of information. Despite being informed on 4 March 2025 that the hearing would proceed on 2 and 4 April 2025, Ms Madonsela only launched her urgent application on 31 March 2025, shortly before the scheduled hearing dates. In a detailed judgment, Tlhotlhalemaje J found that the urgency was self-created. Ms Madonsela had delayed approaching the court and engaged in further correspondence after the critical decision on 4 March 2025, resulting in a material delay that undermined her claim of genuine urgency. Furthermore, her founding affidavit failed to demonstrate adequately that she would not be able to obtain substantial redress in due course, whether at the disciplinary hearing itself or through subsequent unfair dismissal or review proceedings. Allegations concerning the chairperson’s impartiality, breach of settlement, and spoliation were deemed insufficient to justify premature judicial intervention, especially as evidence had not yet been led in the internal proceedings. The court accordingly struck the application from the urgent roll, directing that it could be re-enrolled on the ordinary roll with proper notice and compliance with the rules.
Madonsela serves as a strong cautionary tale for legal practitioners and litigants. It underscores that correspondence and negotiations after a decision crystallises do not pause the urgency clock, and that reliance on broad constitutional provisions without specific factual grounding will not suffice. The judgment also highlights the LC’s commitment to protecting the integrity of disciplinary processes, particularly in serious corruption matters involving regulatory bodies such as the LPC. By prioritising the completion of internal inquiries, the court promotes both administrative fairness while discouraging tactical use of urgent applications to sidestep proper procedures.
By contrast, the judgment of Vukeya AJ in Tintswalo and Others v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (LC) (unreported case no 17268/2024, 10-3-2025) (Vukeya AJ) (Tintswalo), demonstrates a successful urgent application where proper principles were satisfied. In this matter, 115 Metropolitan Officers obtained an interim interdict halting a recruitment process pending resolution of their unfair labour practice (promotion) dispute at the bargaining council. The applicants had applied for Sergeant positions in 2023, only to receive regret letters in September 2024. After referring a dispute and receiving an undertaking from a senior official in October 2024 not to proceed with recruitment in the interim, the City re-advertised the positions in January 2025. The court held that urgency crystallised on the date of re-advertisement, as the applicants had relied in good faith on the employer’s undertaking. There was no self-created urgency. On the substantial redress requirement, the applicants adequately showed that allowing appointments to proceed would render the pending bargaining council arbitration (scheduled for 11 and 12 March 2025) moot.
Having found urgency, the court applied the requirements for interim relief and granted the interdict. It found a prima facie right based on fair labour practices, a binding undertaking by the employer, reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm, and a favourable balance of convenience. The judgment reinforces that written undertakings by authorised officials carry significant weight and that the LC may grant interim protection to preserve the efficacy of bargaining council processes without usurping their jurisdiction.
The contrast between Madonsela and Tintswalo is analytically instructive. In the former, the applicant sought to disrupt an ongoing internal disciplinary process in a high-stakes regulatory context with weaker temporal justification. In the latter, the applicants protected an external statutory process from being undermined by employer conduct, supported by clear reliance and a tangible risk of mootness. Taken together, these judgments reveal a consistent judicial approach: The LC functions primarily as a guardian of process integrity rather than a default first-instance resolver of all disputes.
Conclusion
Urgent relief remains truly exceptional. Success depends on prompt and transparent conduct by the applicant, a meticulously drafted affidavit that properly addresses both procedural and substantive urgency, a genuine risk that ordinary channels will fail to deliver meaningful redress, and due respect for internal and statutory mechanisms unless truly exceptional factors are present.
Overall, this balanced yet firm judicial approach advances the objectives of the LRA by promoting speedy, fair, and effective dispute resolution while preventing congestion of the urgent roll and discouraging forum-shopping. It demands litigants to follow all the prescribed rules and regulations regarding urgent proceedings to avoid unforeseen outcomes. Nevertheless, in a challenging labour landscape marked by municipal instability, and frequent promotion disputes, the LC’s rigorous gatekeeping ensures that urgent applications function as a precise scalpel rather than a blunt instrument, thereby upholding both individual protection and systemic coherence in South African labour jurisprudence.
Tasreeq Ferreira LLB (UWC) is a legal practitioner at BDP Attorneys in Cape Town. Yolo Samela LLB (Unisa) is a final year BCom Law student at Unisa in Johannesburg
